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This paper assesses the inflation-targeting regime in Brazil adopted in June 1999, examining 
the main challenges it has faced over its first three and half years. In particular, we stress two 
important challenges that are also common in other emerging market economies: construction of 
credibility, and high exchange rate volatility.  
The inflation-targeting mechanism has played a key role in macroeconomic stabilization in 
Brazil. In spite of large inflationary shocks, the inflation rate has been maintained at a low level. 
Exchange rate depreciations in 2001 and 2002 were stress tests for the regime. In particular, in 2002 
monetary policy faced a confidence crisis in the future performance of the Brazilian economy and 
an increase in risk aversion in international markets. Rollover rates of domestic public debt 
securities diminished considerably, and the Brazilian economy experienced a “sudden stop” in 
capital inflows to the country, generating a significant nominal depreciation of the exchange rate. 
Inflation targeting in emerging market economies has been a more challenging task than in 
developed economies. The conduct of monetary policy has to build credibility and reduce inflation 
rate levels, and simultaneously deal with a greater vulnerability to shocks. In fact, one basic task of 
the Central Bank of Brazil has been to build credibility as a monetary authority committed to price 
stability in the context of large inflationary shocks. This requires actions consistent with the 
inflation-targeting framework combined with high levels of transparency and communication with 
the public.
1 Furthermore, it is expected that private agents' inflation expectations do not depart way 
from the targets without converging to them in a certain time horizon. We present some evidence 
on: i) the behavior of the central bank; ii) the behavior of private agents' expectations; iii) change in 
inflation dynamics; and iv) exchange rate volatility and pass-through. 
Specifically, we estimate the central bank's reaction function, and find that monetary policy 
has been reacting strongly to inflationary pressures. In particular, the Central Bank reacts to 
inflation expectations, giving evidence that the monetary policy is conducted on a forward-looking 
basis. 
  We show that private sector inflation expectations did not depart significantly from the 
country's inflation targets until September 2002, even when faced with inflationary shocks. We 
present evidence that the inflation targets have worked as an important coordinator of expectations. 
The end of 2002 and beginning of 2003 in turn represents a period dominated by uncertainties 
concerning the future conduct of economic policy. We also find some evidence of a change in 
inflation dynamics, namely a reduction in the degree of inflation persistence, which however seems 
to have shown some signs of resurgence at the end-2002. We also stress the significant inflationary 
pressures stemming from exchange rate volatility. We estimate the pass-through from exchange rate 
changes to the inflation rate using a VAR estimation, showing the higher pass-through for 
"administered or monitored" prices. 
The following section presents an overview of the first three and half years of inflation 
targeting. Section 3 assesses the different challenges for the inflation-targeting regime. Section 4 
deals with exchange rate volatility. A final section concludes the paper. 
 
2. Overview of the first three and half years of inflation targeting 
 
Macroeconomic policy in Brazil over the past three and half years has consisted of three 
basic elements: a floating exchange rate regime, sound fiscal policy, and inflation targeting. The 
                                                 
1 For the importance of transparency and communication, and an assessment of inflation targeting in emerging market 
economies, see Fraga, Goldfajn, and Minella (2003).   2
current inflation-targeting regime was adopted  in mid-1999, after the currency was floated in 
January of the same year. In the first two years, annual inflation rates met their targets, having 
absorbed the initial impact of the exchange rate depreciation in 1999. The successful transition was 
supported by a considerable fiscal improvement, a shift in the primary (non-interest) fiscal balance 
of the consolidated public sector from roughly zero in 1998 to a surplus of 3.23% of GDP in 1999, 
3.51% in 2000, 3.68% in 2001, and 3.9% in 2002. 
Figure 1 shows actual inflation and the targets for 1999-2002. The inflation rate is measured 
by a consumer price index, the IPCA. Brazil's inflation targeting regime includes tolerance intervals 
around the central inflation targets. From 1999 to 2002, the tolerance intervals were 2 percentage 
points above and below the central target (for 2003 and 2004 the intervals were enlarged to 2.5 






















However, in 2001 and 2002, several external and domestic shocks hit the Brazilian economy 
with significant impacts on inflation. The inflation rate reached 7.7% in 2001, 1.7 p.p. above the 
target's upper tolerance interval, and 12.5% in 2002, more than 5 points above the upper limit.
2 In 
2001, a domestic energy crisis, the deceleration of the world economy, the September 11 terrorist 
attacks in the United States, and the Argentine crisis generated strong pressures on the exchange 
rate. In 2002, a further sharp depreciation was driven by increased risk aversion in international 
capital markets, and mainly by a confidence crisis related to uncertainties about the future Brazilian 
macroeconomic policies under a new government. Rollover rates of domestic public debt securities 
diminished considerably, and the Brazilian economy experienced a “sudden stop” in capital inflows 
to the country, generating a significant nominal depreciation of the exchange rate. The country risk 
premium rose from 750 basis points in April 2002 to a peak of 2,400 basis points at the end of 
September. Figure 2 shows the level of the exchange rate since 1998. The exchange rate (measured 
in units of local currency per dollar) rose 20.3% and 53.5% in 2001 and 2002, respectively 
(equivalent to a depreciation of  the domestic currency of 16.9% and 34.8%). In addition to the 
impacts of the exchange rate depreciation, the energy crisis from 2001 to the beginning of 2002, and 
the deregulation of the domestic market for oil by-products also led to direct inflationary pressures. 
                                                 
2 The reasons for the non-fulfillment of the targets in 2001 and 2002 were explained in open letters of the Governor of 
the Central Bank of Brazil to the Minister of Finance, available at www.bcb.gov.br.   3
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Monetary policy has been faced with an important change in relative prices that has pushed 
up the overall inflation rate. The administered by contract or monitored prices  – administered 
prices, for short – have increased by substantially more than the other prices – market prices, for 
short. Considering the period since the start of inflation targeting in Brazil, the ratio of administered 
prices to market prices has increased 31.4% (1999:7 - 2003:2). The administered prices are defined 
as those that are relatively insensitive to domestic demand and supply conditions or that are in 
someway regulated by a public agency.
3 
The dynamics of administered prices differ from those of market prices in three ways: i) 
dependence on international prices in the case of oil by-products; ii) greater pass-through from the 
exchange rate;
4 and iii) stronger backward-looking behavior.
5 
Using the structural model of the Central Bank
6 and information concerning the mechanisms 
for the adjustment of administered prices, it is possible to estimate the contribution for the inflation 
rate stemming from exchange rate pass-through, inflation inertia from the previous year, and 
inflation of administered prices and market prices that is not explained by the exchange rate pass-
through and the mentioned inertia. Table 1 shows the estimated values for 2001 and 2002. In 2001, 
38% of the inflation rate can be explained by the depreciation of the exchange rate, whereas for 
2002 the contribution of the exchange rate stood at 46%. 
  In 2001 and 2002, the Central Bank aimed at minimizing the potential inflationary effects of 
the different shocks, mainly the exchange rate depreciation and the increase in administered prices. 
The main goal of monetary policy was to limit the propagation of the shocks to the other prices of 
the economy. Figure 3 presents the path of the basic interest rate – the Selic rate – controlled by the 
Central Bank. Between March and July 2001, the Central Bank raised the interest rate significantly 
(375 b.p.), interrupting the downward trend observed previously. Some improvement in the 
macroeconomic context at the beginning of 2002 allowed some reduction in the interest rate, 
interrupted by the inflationary pressure coming from the exchange rate depreciation. 
                                                 
3 The group includes, among others, oil by-products, fixed telephone fees, residential electricity, and public 
transportation. The aggregate weight of administered prices in the IPCA was 28.0% in December 2002. 
4 There are three basic links: i) the price of oil by-products for consumption depends on international oil prices 
denominated in domestic currency; ii) part of the resetting of electricity rates is linked to changes in the exchange rate; 
and iii) the contracts for price adjustments for electricity and telephone rates link these adjustments, at least partially, to 
the General Price Index (IGP), which is more affected by the exchange rate than the consumer price indexes. 
5 Electricity and telephone rates are generally adjusted annually, and the contractual clauses usually stipulate that 
adjustments should be based on a weighted average of the past change of the IGP price index and the exchange rate. 
6 For an overview of the structural model, see Bogdanski et. al. (2000). Using the aggregate supply curve, which relates 
current market price inflation to the expected and past headline inflation, output gap, and exchange rate change, we 
estimate the contributions of the exchange rate pass-through and of inertia from the previous year to the market prices. 









Market Price Inflation Excluding 
Exchange Rate Pass-Through and Inertia 
2.4 28 3.9 31
Administered Price Inflation Excluding 
Exchange Rate Pass-Through and Inertia 
1.7 24 1.9 15
Inertia  0.7 10 0.9 7
Exchange Rate Pass-Through  2.9 38 5.8 46
Total 7.7 100 12.5 100
2001 2002
Table 1
Contributions for Inflation: 2001-2002.




























































































































































We can also verify that there has been a gain in terms of the variability of the inflation rate, 
output, and interest rate. Table 2 reports the average, standard error and coefficient of variation 
(ratio of standard error to average) for these variables. It compares the first three and half years of 
inflation targeting with the Real Plan period before the adoption of inflation targeting. For the 
earlier period, the table also reports the figures for a shorter sample, which excludes the first 
quarters of the Real Plan, which were characterized by a transition to stabilization. For the inflation-
targeting period, we also consider a shorter sample that excludes the second half of 2002. The 
inflation rate is measured by the IPCA, output by seasonally adjusted GDP, and the (nominal) 
interest rate by the Selic rate. We use quarterly data. In the case of GDP, we use the annualized 
quarter-over-quarter growth rates. The variability of output and the interest rate is lower in the 
inflation-targeting period. The volatility of inflation in turn is lower if we consider the shorter 
sample for the inflation-targeting period. This does not imply necessarily that there have been gains 
in terms of the trade-off between output and inflation because this result also depends on the 
magnitude and variability of the shocks that hit the economy. On average, output growth is higher 
and the interest rate is lower in the inflation-targeting period. The inflation rate is lower in the 
inflation-targeting period if we compare it to the whole period before inflation targeting. In the case 
of the 1996:01-1999:02 period, the lower average inflation rate is to a large extent a consequence of   5
the pegged exchange rate regime, which turned out to be unsustainable in the medium run. When 
the inflation targeting sample ends in 2002:04, the standard deviation of inflation is higher, 
























Real Plan Before 
Inflation Targeting 
1994:4 - 1999:2 10.3 9.2 0.89 2.0 6.3 3.16 35.4 14.1 0.40
1996:1 - 1999:2 5.8 4.8 0.84 2.0 5.2 2.55 28.2 6.0 0.21
Inflation Targeting 
1999:3 - 2002:2 7.1 3.0 0.42 2.4 3.5 1.46 18.0 1.4 0.08
1999:3 - 2002:4 8.9 6.0 0.68 2.5 3.3 1.28 18.2 1.6 0.09
Table 2
Average, Standard Deviation and Coefficient of Variation for Inflation Rate, GDP and Interest Rate







3. Constructing credibility 
 
  The success of inflation targeting hinges, to a large extent, on the construction of credibility. 
Private agents should believe that the central bank will act consistently within the inflation-targeting 
framework. Gaining credibility, however, takes time. In the context of large shocks, even with a 
strong response by the monetary authority, expectations will tend to deviate from the targets. In this 
case, communication with the public so as to explain the reasons of the non-fulfillment of the 
targets becomes crucial. Furthermore, it is important that expectations converge to the target over a 
certain time horizon. In this section, we present some evidence on: i) the behavior of the central 
bank, ii) the behavior of private agents' expectations, iii) the change in inflation dynamics. 
 
3.1. Reaction function of the Central Bank 
  We estimate a reaction function for the Central Bank of Brazil that relates the interest rate to 
deviations of expected inflation from the target, allowing also for some interest-rate smoothing and 
reaction to the output gap and movements of the exchange rate: 
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*
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where i t is the Selic rate decided by the Monetary Policy Committee (Copom), E tpt+j is inflation 
expectations and p
*
t+j is the inflation target, both referring to some period in the future as will be 
explained below,
7 y t is the output gap, and  1 - D t e  is the nominal exchange rate variation. We use 
monthly data. Monthly industrial production (seasonally adjusted) measured by IBGE is the proxy 
for output. The output gap was obtained by the difference between the actual and the HP-filtered 
series.
8 
  We use two sources for inflation expectations. The first one is the inflation forecasts of the 
Central Bank of Brazil presented in its quarterly Inflation Report. The advantage of this source is 
                                                 
7 Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1998, 2000) estimate forward-looking reaction functions for the U.S., Germany, Japan, 
U.K., France, and Italy. Instead of using central bank or survey expectations, they employ a Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimation. The reaction function is basically a forward-looking version of the backward-looking 
reaction function proposed by Taylor (1993). 
8 Estimations using output growth and output gap obtained by extraction of a linear trend were also performed. The 
results were similar and are not reported in this paper.    6
that  the Copom should make interest rate decisions based on its own inflation forecasts. The 
forecasts in the Inflation Report are made assuming a constant interest rate equal to the one decided 
in the previous Copom meeting. Therefore, they signal whether the Central Bank should change the 
interest rate.
9 The second source is obtained from a daily survey that the Central Bank conducts 
among financial institutions and consulting firms.
10 The survey asks what firms expect for year-end 
inflation in the current and in the following years.
11 
  The Brazilian inflation-targeting regime sets year-end inflation targets for the current and the 
following two years. Since it is necessary to have a single measurement of the deviation of inflation 
from the target, we have used a weighted average of current year and following year expected 
deviation of inflation from the target, where the weights are inversely proportional to the number of 
months remaining in the year.
12 
  Tables 3 and 4 report the estimations using the Central Bank's inflation forecasts (sample 
1999:07-2002:12) and the market forecasts (sample 2000:01-2002:12), respectively.
13 We present 
three specifications: the first includes only the deviation of expected inflation from the targets, the 
second one adds the output  gap term, and the third includes also the 12-month exchange rate 
change. When relevant, we also compare the results to an estimation with sample ending in 2002:06 
(not shown). 
  The first noteworthy result is the high degree of interest-rate smoothing. The coefficient on 
the lagged interest rate is between 0.7 and 0.9.  Most importantly, the point estimates of the 
coefficient on inflation expectations are greater than one and significantly different from zero in all 
specifications. Moreover, in the case of the estimations with market inflation expectations, the 
coefficient is statistically greater than one, with point estimates around 2.0-2.3 (the p-values for the 
test that the coefficient is equal to 1 are 0.012, 0.040, and 0.053 in specifications I, II, and III, 
respectively).
14 In the case of central bank expectations, the values are less stable across 
specifications (from 2.7 to 5.7).
15 The estimated coefficient is significantly different from 1 or close 
to that (the p-values for the test that the coefficient is equal to 1 are 0.150, 0.101, and 0.058 in 
specifications I, II, and III, respectively). Therefore, we can conclude that the Central Bank has 
been reacting strongly to expected inflation. It conducts monetary policy on a forward-looking 
basis, and responds to inflationary pressures. 
                                                 
9 Public information about the Copom’s inflation forecasts is available only on a quarterly basis. In order to obtain 
monthly figures, it was necessary to interpolate the data. 
10 This survey is available at the Central Bank of Brazil website (www.bcb.gov.br).  In this estimation, we use the 
inflation expectations collected on the eve of Copom meetings, avoiding possible endogeneity problems. 
11 In November 2001 the survey started collecting expectations for the following 12 months as well.  
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D p p p p , where  Dt is the measure of expected deviation of inflation from the 
target, j indexes the month, and t indexes the year. Observe that Dt does not contain inflation expectations referring to 
two years in advance, despite the existence of a target for such period. Given the shorter lags in the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy estimated for the Brazilian economy and the higher uncertainty associated with the 
forecasts, it is reasonable to assume the Copom concentrates on current and following year forecasts when making 
interest rate decisions. 
13 The data on market expectations for the IPCA are available only as of January 2000. 
14 Favero and Giavazzi (2002) have also estimated a similar reaction function using the market expectations for a 
shorter sample. They have found a coefficient equal to 1.78. Silva and Portugal (2002) have found different results 
using a different specification. They have compared the inflation-targeting period with the period of stabilization before 
inflation targeting, using in the regression a one-month ahead expected inflation obtained with an autoregressive 
estimation. 
15 If we compare to a sample that ends in 2002:06, the point estimates in that shorter sample are similar when using 
market’s expectations, and are lower in the case of central bank’s expectations, although not statistically different.   7
I II III
Constant 1.65 3.06* 3.80**
(1.08) (1.59) (1.57)
Interest Rate (t-1) 0.90*** 0.82*** 0.77***
(0.06) (0.09) (0.09)
Inflation Rate Expectations (deviations from the target) 5.70* 3.54** 2.71***
(3.20) (1.51) (0.87)
Output Gap (t-1) -0.36* -0.18
(0.21) (0.19)
Exchange Rate (t-1) (twelve-month change) 0.05*
(0.03)
R-squared 0.9129 0.9160 0.9251
Adjusted R-squared 0.9084 0.9094 0.9170
LM Test for Autocorrelation of Residuals (p-values)
1 lag 0.7853 0.7210 0.7543
4 lags 0.6831 0.5298 0.5025
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate the coefficient is significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Regressors
Table 3
Estimation of Reaction Function of Central Bank Using Central Bank's Inflation Expectations
Dependent Variable: Selic Interest Rate Target




   
 
I II III
Constant 4.58*** 5.38** 5.24**
(1.52) (2.07) (2.12)
Interest Rate (t-1) 0.71*** 0.67*** 0.67***
(0.09) (0.12) (0.12)
Inflation Rate Expectations (deviations from the target) 2.32*** 2.09*** 2.05***
(0.53) (0.53) (0.54)
Output Gap (t-1) -0.10 -0.07
(0.15) (1.67)
Exchange Rate (t-1) (twelve-month change) 0.01
(0.03)
R-squared 0.9205 0.9214 0.9219
Adjusted R-squared 0.9157 0.9140 0.9118
LM Test for Autocorrelation of Residuals (p-values)
1 lag 0.6586 0.6411 0.5794
4 lags 0.5362 0.3991 0.4150
Notes: Standard error in parantheses. *, ** and *** indicate the coefficient is significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Regressors
Table 4
Estimation of Reaction Function of Central Bank Using Market's Inflation Expectations
Dependent Variable: Selic Interest Rate Target
Coefficients and standard errors
   8
  The coefficient on output gap has the wrong sign, but it is statistically significant only in one 
of the specifications. One possible explanation for the negative sign is that part of the supply shocks 
that hit the economy led to an increase in inflation and simultaneously to a reduction in output. This 
clearly occurred in the case of the rationing in electricity. Since we observe a simultaneous interest 
rate increase and reduction of output, if the inflation expectations term does not capture this change 
completely, we tend to obtain negative coefficients for the output gap term. Furthermore, note that 
when we include the exchange rate the coefficient becomes not significant. External shocks tend to 
generate inflationary pressures at the same time that tend to decrease output, at least in the short 
run. 
   
3.2. Inflation expectations and the role of the targets  
  Since mid-2001, 12-month inflation has been above the upper limit of the target tolerance 
interval.
16 A naive analysis of the inflation-targeting regime in Brazil might say that this regime has 
not been successful in controlling inflation. Nevertheless, inflation outcomes are not a sufficient 
statistic to evaluate the performance of the Central Bank given the magnitude of the supply shocks. 
The evolution of inflation expectations, and the role of the target are also relevant variables in 
assessing the credibility of the Central Bank.    
  In the context of significant shocks, it is crucial that private agents understand that, even 
with a monetary policy consistent with the inflation-targeting framework, actual inflation may 
breach the targets. Given the magnitude of the shocks that hit the Brazilian economy, a strong 
reaction of the monetary authorities cannot avoid an increase in the inflation rate and some 
departure of inflation expectations from the original targets. In terms of inflation expectations, it is 
important is that they converge to the targets over a certain time horizon. 
   Two conditions are necessary to guarantee inflation expectations will remain under control. 
The first is that the conduct of monetary policy should be consistent with the main guidelines 
expressed by the Copom. In this sense, the reaction function estimated in the previous subsection 
shows that the Central Bank has been acting consistently within the inflation-targeting framework. 
The second condition for controlling expectations is clear communication with the public. It is 
important that private agents understand why actual inflation was above the target and how 
monetary policy is being conducted in order to drive inflation back to the target. The Central Bank 
of Brazil communicates with the market via informal speeches and formal documents, such as the 
minutes of the Copom meetings, which are released one week after the meetings, and the Inflation 
Report, which is published on a quarterly basis. Furthermore, the reasons for the non-fulfillment of 
the inflation targets in 2001 and 2002 were thoroughly explained in open letters to the Minister of 
Finance. 
  The conduct of monetary policy has been based on accommodating the first-round effects of 
supply and cost-push shocks. This means monetary policy will allow relative price movements to 
affect inflation, but will neutralize the second-round effects. The Central Bank has developed a 
methodology that calculates the inflationary impact of current supply shocks as well as the 
secondary impact of past shocks (due to inertia in the inflation process). Since the primary effect is 
accommodated, the optimal inflation path may imply that 12-month ahead inflation is above the 
previous annual target. Therefore, in this situation, given that the Central Bank is no longer aiming 
for the previous inflation target, it uses an "adjusted target". More specifically, the original target is 
adjusted in order to take into account the primary effects of the change in relative prices and of past 
inertia that will be accommodated. Part of inertia is accommodated because the Central Bank also 
takes output volatility into account in its decisions. The new target is publicly announced.
17 
Although there is a credibility loss stemming from the target change itself, the gains in terms of 
                                                 
16 The targets are established only for year-end inflation. We have calculated targets for the other months of the year 
using linear interpolation.  
17 The adjusted targets for 2003 and 2004, 8.5% and 5.5%, were published in the open letter from the Governor of the 
Central Bank to the Minister of Finance on 1/21/03 (Banco Central do Brasil, 2003). For a more detailed explanation of 
the methodology, see Freitas, Minella, and Riella (2002).   9
transparency and communication are more significant. Private agents know the target the Central 
Bank is pursuing. Actually, keeping the old target would affect the credibility of the Central Bank 
because it could be considered unattainable. 
  Figure 4 shows the 12-month ahead inflation that is expected by the market, the 12-month 
ahead target, and the actual 12-month accumulated inflation.
18 It is clear that inflation expectations 
remained below the upper limit of the tolerance interval prior to the last quarter of 2002. This is true 
even since the second half of 2001, when actual inflation  surpassed the tolerance interval. The 
correlation coefficient between the actual and expected inflation series has increased. From 2000:1 
to 2002:1, the correlation is 0.22, but with the sample ending in 2002:12, the value is 0.74. As the 
graph shows, since mid-2000, the 12-month ahead inflation expectations have been below the actual 
12-month inflation. This indicates that private agents tend to expect that the rise in the inflation rate 
will tend to reverse in the medium run. The fact that actual inflation has been above the value that 
was expected 12 months ago reflects basically the frequent and large cost-push shocks that hit the 
economy during this period. It is noteworthy that the difficulties the country faced last year 
impacted inflation expectations more significantly only in the last quarter of 2002. The median of 
inflation expectations for 2002 leveled out at around 4.5% through September, but then rapidly 
deteriorated afterwards and reached 11% at the end of December. The increase in expectations is 
associated with the expected inflationary effects of the strong exchange rate depreciation and the 
uncertainties about the future stance of monetary policy under the new government. It does not 
seem to reflect lack of credibility of the conduct of monetary policy during the period, but 
uncertainty about its maintenance in the near future. 
 
   
Figure 4
12-Month Ahead Expected Inflation and Inflation Target, and Previous 12-Month Actual 
Inflation

























































































































  Another source of evidence suggesting Central Bank gains in credibility comes from 
evaluation of the role of the targets in expectations formation. We have run OLS regressions of 12-
month ahead market inflation expectations on its own lags, the 12-month ahead inflation target, the 
interest rate, and 12-month inflation rate (sample 2000:01-2003:02). Table 5 reports the results for 
this specification in column I. All coefficients are statistically significant and have the expected 
sign. The positive coefficient on the interest rate may be explained by the reaction of interest rates 
to inflationary pressures. When facing a large supply shock, the central bank raises the interest rate. 
However, the inflationary effects are not completely eliminated because of three reasons: i) 
                                                 
18 We estimate the 12-month ahead expected inflation rate using the expected inflation for the remaining months of the 
current year and, for the remaining months necessary to achieve 12 months, the corresponding proportion of expected 
inflation for the following year. The 12-month ahead target is estimated by interpolation.   10
presence of lags in the monetary policy transmission mechanisms; ii) the Central Bank also takes 
output volatility i nto account in its decisions; and iii) the Central Bank has acted so as to 
accommodate first order effects of the change in relative prices (and neutralize second-order 
effects). As a result, we observe that interest rate and inflation expectations move in the same 
direction. Since the Central Bank reacts to its own expectations of inflation, interest rate movements 
also reflect the central bank's inflation expectations. 
 
 
I II III IV
Constant  -7.35***  -7.33***  -6.22**  -6.33**
(2.33) (2.32) (2.30) (2.33)
Market Inflation Rate Expectations (t-1) 0.91*** 0.86*** 0.89*** 0.86***
(0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19)
Market Inflation Rate Expectations (t-2)  -0.80***  -0.72***  -0.62***  -0.60***
(0.17) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20)
Interest Rate (t-1) 0.24** 0.19 0.18 0.15
(0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12)
Inflation Rate Target (12-Month Ahead) 1.06*** 1.22*** 0.92*** 1.01**
(0.33) (0.36) (0.32) (0.37)
12-Month Inflation Rate (t-1) 0.45*** 0.46*** 0.35** 0.37**
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16)
12-Month Exchange Rate Change (t-1) 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Embi Plus Brazil (t-1) 0.06* 0.05
(0.03) (0.03)
R-squared 0.9148 0.9186 0.9247 0.9255
Adjusted R-squared 0.9007 0.9017 0.9091 0.9069
LM Test for Autocorrelation of Residuals (p-values)
1 lag 0.2403 0.25875 0.5061 0.5465
4 lags 0.3869 0.2711 0.1725 0.0540
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate the coefficient is significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Estimation of Inflation Expectations
Table 5
Regressors
Coefficients and standard errors
Dependent Variable: Market Inflation Rate Expectations - 2000:1 - 2003:2
 
   
 
  Most importantly, expected inflation reacts significantly to the inflation targets (coefficient 
around 1). One could consider that this result could be a consequence of some correlation between 
targets and past inflation, but note that the regression also includes the actual 12-month inflation 
rate. Therefore, there are indications t hat the inflation targets play an important role for 
expectations. The past inflation term, however, has a statistically significant coefficient, indicating 
that past inflation still plays a role. It is interesting to note that, if we estimate the same regression 
with the sample ending in 2002:09, the past inflation term is not significant. Figure 5a shows the 
recursive estimation for the coefficient on the past inflation term. It started increasing at the end of 
2001. We can consider that there are two reasons for this behavior. First, when the economy is hit 
by a significant inflationary shock, this tends to raise inflation expectations. Second, in the last 
months of 2002 and beginning of 2003, when the recursive estimates present higher growth, private 
agents assigned some non-trivial probability to monetary policy under the future government being 
less strict on inflation. Since the economy was being hit by inflationary shocks, private agents 
tended to consider that the inflationary effects of these shocks would be more persistence over time. 
As a result, we observe a higher weight on past inflation in their expectations. Specifications II, III, 
and IV also include the 12-month exchange rate change and the EMBI Plus for Brazil. For a sample 
ending in 2002:09 (not shown), the EMBI Plus is not statistically significant, but with the extended 
sample it becomes significant, possibly reflecting the effect of the confidence crisis of end-2002.   11
Although the exchange rate change is not statistically significant, we show its recursive estimates in 






























































































Coefficient Coefficient + 2 s.e.
Coefficient - 2 s.e.
Figure 5b
Recursive Estimates of the Coefficient 






















































































Coefficient Coefficient + 2 s.e.
Coefficient - 2 s.e.
 
   
  The particularity of the transition period to the new government is clear when we estimate 
the four specifications with a sample ending in September 2002, and forecast inflation expectations 
for the following five months. Figure 6 shows these out-of-sample forecasts. All of them point to an 
increase in inflation expectations, but are significantly below actual inflation expectations, in spite 
















Jul-02  Aug-02  Sep-02  Oct-02  Nov-02  Dec-02  Jan-03  Feb-03 
Inflation Expectations  Forecast Specification I  Forecast Specification IV  Forecast + 2 s.e. (I)  Forecast - 2 s.e. (I)   
   
  Since November 2001, the Central Bank has published 12-month ahead inflation 
expectations, which is recorded in Figure 7. In the estimations we have used so far, we have 
employed a weighted average of the expectations for the end of the current and following years. We 
can see that inflation expectations have reverted since the beginning of 2003. 
  In summary, although the actual inflation rate has been above the upper limit of the 
tolerance interval in 2001 and 2002, the inflation-targeting regime has been successful in anchoring 
expectations. This is a consequence of the credibility gains that the Central Bank has achieved since 
the implementation of the inflation-targeting regime. Only in the fourth quarter of 2002 did inflation   12
expectations depart from the targets as a result of the confidence crisis. Credibility, however, is still 



































































































































3.3. Change in inflation dynamics 
  As the inflation-targeting regime is supposed to affect the formation of inflation 
expectations, we can consider the possibility that the backward-looking component of price 
adjustments has become less important. The share of backward-looking firms could have become 
smaller and/or firms could place less weight on past inflation when adjusting prices. This would 
reduce the degree of persistence in inflation. Following Kuttner and Posen (1999), we estimate a 
simple aggregate supply curve for the low inflation period to assess if the inflation-targeting regime 
was accompanied by some structural change.
19 Using monthly data, we regress the inflation rate 
(measured by the IPCA) on its own lags, the unemployment rate
20 (lagged one period), and the 
exchange rate change in 12 months (lagged one period). The sample starts in 1995:07 and ends in 
2002:12.
21 The regression also includes dummy variables that multiply some of the mentioned 
regressors for the inflation-targeting period. The inflation rate and exchange rate change are 
measured in monthly terms. 
Table 6 shows a specification that includes only one lag for inflation, and another that 
includes two. It is important to stress two aspects of the estimation. First, dummies for the inflation 
targeting period that multiply unemployment and the  exchange rate do not enter significantly; 
therefore, they were excluded from the estimation. Second, we have included a dummy variable that 
assumes the value of one for the last three months of 2002. Without adding this dummy, the 
residuals in both specifications present serial correlation. Actually, the end of 2002 is a very 
peculiar period, which it is difficult to be fitted by a simple Phillips curve. Figure 8 shows monthly 
inflation since 1994. It is evident the change that took place in the mentioned period. 
 
                                                 
19 It is important to stress that the structural model of the Central Bank used for inflation forecasting employs quarterly 
data, and has a different specification: for example, it includes a forward-looking term for inflation, and a term for 
output gap instead of unemployment rate. 
20 We use seasonally adjusted unemployment rate (criterion seven days) produced by IBGE. The results are 
qualitatively similar if we use the raw data or the unemployment rate estimated according to the criterion of thirty days. 
21 Since exchange rate change refers to the 12-month change, the sample starts 12 months after the start of the 




















Unemployment (t-1) -0.08 -0.09*
(0.05) (0.05)







Adjusted R-squared 0.5271 0.5624
LM Test for Autocorrelation of Residuals (p-values)
1 lag 0.6646 0.7022
4 lags 0.2218 0.3599
2 Dummy has value one in 2002:10 - 2002:12, and zero otherwise.
Table 6
Estimation of Aggregate Supply Curve
Dependent Variable: Monthly Inflation Rate - 1995:08 - 2002:12
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate thecoefficient is significant at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level,respectively. Since exchange rate change refersto the 12-month change,the samplestarts in 1995:07
to avoid the inclusion of data b
1Dummy has value one in the inflation-targetingperiod (1999:06-2002:12), and zero otherwise. It multiplies
the associated variable.
Regressors































































































































































































































   14
From the estimated coefficients on the dummy variables in both specifications, we can 
conclude there is a statistically significant change in the constant and in the coefficient on lagged 
inflation in the inflation-targeting period. The point estimate of the autoregressive coefficient in 
specification I falls from 0.56 to 0.10 in the inflation targeting period (0.56 minus 0.46). This 
estimation indicates that there has been a substantial reduction in the degree of inflation persistence 
after inflation targeting was adopted. This implies a lower output cost to curb inflationary pressures 
and to reduce average inflation.
22 Using recursive estimation for the lagged coefficient, however, 
we do not observe a reduction in the coefficient. We have also used time-varying coefficient 
estimation for the simple aggregate supply equation. We regress the inflation rate on its own lag, the 
unemployment rate, and the exchange rate change, setting the coefficient on the lagged inflation as 
time varying. The filtered values for the coefficient are drawn in Figure 9. We can see a decreasing 





































































































































































































































Coefficient Coefficient + 2 s.e. Coefficient - 2 s.e.  
 
The coefficient on lagged unemployment is negative and statistically significant or close to 
that. Its p-values are 0.130 and 0.068 in specifications I and II, respectively. Since the coefficient 
value is about  -0.08, a one-percentage point increase in the unemployment rate decreases the 
inflation rate by 1.0 percentage points when measured in annual terms. Considering the indirect 
effects via inflation inertia, the total effect on inflation over a year is 1.95 p.p. and 1.06 p.p. for the 
whole sample and for the inflation-targeting period, respectively (the periods have different degrees 
of inflation persistence). 
The exchange rate change also enters significantly. The coefficient is around 0.08, which, 
considering the lagged inflation term, generates a 12-month pass-through of 18% and 9% for the 
whole sample and for the inflation-targeting period, respectively. As in the unemployment case, the 
smaller pass-through in the recent period is a consequence of the lower degree of persistence in 
inflation. However, using a recursive estimation for the coefficient on the exchange rate change, we 
observe a decline in the pass-through with the adoption of the floating exchange regime in January 
1999 (Figure 10). This result is in line with those in Muinhos (2001), which shows a structural 
                                                 
22 Note that, although the constant in the regression is higher in the inflation-targeting period, the unconditional 
expected inflation (up to a constant referring to the natural unemployment rate) is equal to 1.5 and 1.1 for the periods 
before and after inflation-targeting adoption using the first specification, and 1.5 and 1.0 employing the second 
specification.     15
break in the pass-through coefficient when the exchange rate regime changed. The estimations in 
that paper are conducted using a linear and a non-linear Phillips curve. The pass-through in the 
same quarter of the exchange rate change fell from more than 50% to less than 10%. In the 


























































4. Exchange rate changes and pass-through 
 
Dealing with exchange rate volatility has been one of the main challenges to the inflation-
targeting regime in emerging markets economies. Compared to industrialized economies, emerging 
markets seem to be more sensitive to the effects of financial crises than other countries. Exchange 
rate market volatility generates frequent revisions of inflation rate expectations and may result in 
non-fulfillment of inflation targets. As a general rule, the actions of the central bank should not 
move the exchange rate to artificial or unsustainable levels. Nevertheless, the central bank may 
react to exchange rate movements to curb the resulting inflationary pressures and to reduce the 
financial impact on dollar denominated assets and liabilities on firms' balance sheets. 
Regarding the financial problems associated with exchange rate volatility, Haussmann, 
Panizza and Stein (2001) have argued that all countries that are not able to issue debt in their own 
currency are more vulnerable to the impact of currency mismatches in their balance sheets. Those 
mismatches are even more dramatic in a financially integrated world, where rumors of financial 
problems may lead to capital flight that might produce self-fulfilling crises, generating a bad 
equilibrium. As observed by Schmidt-Hebel and Werner (2002), the level of reserves works as 
insurance against the occurrence of this bad equilibrium. If all the burden of the adjustment to 
capital outflows during financial crisis is supported by exchange rate depreciation, the country 
might have a backward bending exchange rate supply curve with no equilibrium being possible. 
They justify foreign exchange rate intervention based on the following reasons: (i) facilitate 
adjustment to sudden reductions in capital inflows; (ii) accumulate reserves; (iii) reduce excessive 
exchange rate volatility (associated with lower liquidity in foreign exchange markets); and (iv) raise 
the supply of exchange rate insurance. 
  Given the problems associated with exchange rate volatility and the pros of intervention, the 
Central Bank of Brazil, like those in other emerging markets economies, including some that have 
also adopted inflation targeting, has actually been implementing a dirty-floating exchange rate   16
policy.
23 Interventions are made as transparent as possible in order to avoid the concern expressed 
by Mishkin (2000) that intervention may hinder the credibility of monetary policy as the public may 
realize that stabilizing the exchange rate takes precedence over promoting price stability as a policy 
objective. 
In Brazil, the volatility of the exchange rate has been considerable. From 1999:07 through 
2002:12, the exchange rate (monthly average) depreciated on average 1.8% per month, with a 
standard error of 4.2 and a coefficient of variation (ratio of standard error to average) of 2.4. The 
inflationary pressures resulting from exchange rate depreciation are more related to the magnitude 
of the depreciation than to the pass-through coefficient.
24 According to the structural model of the 
Central Bank, the pass-through to market prices inflation, as a percentage of the observed 
depreciation, is 12% after one year of the depreciation. The pass-through to administered prices is 
estimated to be 25%, resulting in a pass-through of about 16% for the headline IPCA. In line with 
these estimates, between January 2001 and December 2002, the price of the dollar moved from R$ 
1.95 to R$ 3.64, implying an increase of 86.7%. In the same period, IPCA rose 21.2%. In this sense, 
Brazil seems to be closer to the lower end of the estimates done by Haussmann, Panizza and Stein 
(2001). They estimated the pass-through accumulated in 12 months for more than 40 countries and 
found a value below 5% for G -7 countries, and, on the other extreme, figures above 50% for 
countries like Mexico, Paraguay and Poland.  
  We can also use a VAR estimation with monthly data to assess the pass-through and the 
importance of exchange rate shocks to the variability of inflation. We use two specifications. Both 
include output, the spread of EMBI+ (Emerging Markets Bond Index Plus) over Treasury bonds,
25 
the exchange rate (monthly average), and the interest rate (Selic rate - monthly average). Output is 
measured by seasonally-adjusted industrial production. The inclusion of the EMBI+ was necessary 
because it is a good indicator for financial crises, both foreign crises (Mexico, Asia, Russia, 
Argentina) and domestic (beginning of 1999), which have an important impact on interest rates. In 
the first specification, we use administered and market prices as variables, whereas in the second we 
use the consumer price index (IPCA) instead. We estimate the model in levels, that is, using I(1) 
and I(0)  regressors instead of using the error correction representation.
26 The estimation is 
consistent and captures possible existing cointegration relationships (Sims, Stock, and Watson, 
1990; Watson, 1994). The variables used are the log-levels of output, administered prices, market 
prices, IPCA and the exchange rate, and the levels of the EMBI+ spread and the interest rate.
27 We 
use a Cholesky decomposition with the following order in the first specification: output, 
administered prices, market prices, EMBI+, exchange rate, and interest rate. In the second 
specification, the consumer price index substitutes for administered and market prices. Since the 
financial variables react more rapidly to shocks, we include them after output and price. We also 
conduct the estimate using the interest rate before the exchange rate. The results are very similar. 
The sample includes all the period of the Real Plan, from September 1994 through December 
2002.
28 In order to capture possible changes in the second semester of 2002, we also estimate the 
impulse responses using a sample that ends in 2002:06.   
Figure 11 shows the impulse responses to a one standard deviation of exchange rate shock. 
It presents the point estimates for the samples ending in June 2002 and December 2002, and the 
                                                 
23 Calvo and Reinhart (2002) discuss the limited empirical evidence of truly free-floating countries.  
24 See Goldfajn and Werlang (2000) for the reasons for the low pass-through in the Brazilian January 1999 devaluation 
episode. 
25 We use EMBI from Sept./1994 through Dec./1998, and EMBI+ after that. 
26 According to augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests, we can accept the presence of a unit root for the log-levels of 
IPCA, administered prices, market prices, exchange rate, interest rate, and for the level of EMBI+ spread. We reject the 
presence of unit root for the monthly change of those variables, and for the level of interest rate. 
27 The lag length of the VAR estimations was chosen according to Schwarz criterion, but we test for the presence of 
serial correlation of residuals, and increase the number of lags when necessary to obtain no serial correlated residuals. 
We have used four lags for both specifications. 
28 J uly and August 1994 were excluded because the price indexes were still "contaminated" by the previous high 
inflation period. In this case, the start of the sample is adjusted according to the number of lags used.   17
two-standard-error bands for the former sample, which were estimated using a Monte Carlo 
experiment with 1000 draws. The values shown are percentage points. We stress two aspects. First, 
the responses of administered and market prices are positive and statistically significant, and the 
increase in administered prices is greater than that of market. Second, when the sample includes the 
last months of 2002, we notice an increase in the responses, but still inside the confidence interval 
of the June sample,  which is a kind of stability test for impulse response. Figure 12 shows the 
responses in the case of the specification that includes the IPCA instead of the administered and 
market prices.
29 Again we see an increase in the response in the last months of 2002, but still inside 
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Using the full sample, the exchange rate increases initially 2.6%, reaching a total of 4.3% in 
the second month, and starts decreasing after that. The rise of both administered prices and market 
prices reaches a maximum in the eighth month. The values of the pass-through are presented in 
Table 7, which records the results for the sample ending in December 2002. We estimate the pass-
through as the ratio of the price increase in a 12-month horizon to the value of the exchange rate 
shock. If we consider the value of the exchange shock in the first month, the pass-through is 32.7% 
for the administered prices, and 17% for the market prices (19.7% and 7.8%, respectively, if we use 
                                                 
29 The response of price level stabilizes if we consider a 24-month horizon.   18
the shorter sample, which ends in June 2002). Considering the value of the exchange rate shock in 
the second month, the pass-through is 22% and 11% (12.1% and 4.8% with the shorter sample). The 
pass-through for the administered prices is 1.9 higher than that for the market prices (2.5 with the 
shorter sample). The pass-through to IPCA was estimated at 17.9 and 11.4% (14.1% and 8.4% with 









Pass-Through Using the 
First Month Exchange Rate 
Shock
32.9% 17.0% 17.9% 20.0% 11.3% 13.1%
Pass-Through Using the 
Second Month Exchange 
Rate Shock
22.3% 11.0% 11.4% 18.8% 10.3% 11.5%
Ratio of Pass-Through 




Pass-Through Considering Different Specifications:
Ratio of Price Change (12-month horizon) to an Exchange Rate Shock
Value of Exchange Rate 
Shock Considered
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Real Plan Period Inflation-Targeting Period
 
   
 
Since the inflation-targeting regime may have represented  a structural change in the 
relationships, and the exchange rate regime is different from the majority of the previous period, we 
estimate a VAR model for the first three years of inflation targeting (1999:07-2002:12). However, 
the sample size is too short, and the response of administered and market prices is positive, but not 
statistically significant using a two-standard-error band (they are significant in the first months if we 
use a one-standard-error band).  To compare with the Real Plan period, however, we show the point 
estimates in Table 7.
30 One can see a decrease in the pass-through specially using the first month 
exchange rate shock in both administered and market prices
31. These results using a VAR model are 
in line with those in the recursive estimation of the aggregate supply curve shown in subsection 3.3 
and again in Muinhos (2001). 
Therefore, exchange rate volatility is an important source of inflation variability. The design 
of the inflation-targeting framework has to take into account this issue to avoid that a possible non-





  The inflation-targeting regime in Brazil is relatively new, but has shown to be important in 
achieving low levels of inflation even in a context of large shocks. The presence of a central bank 
committed to the achievement of pre-announced inflation targets has worked as an important 
coordinator of expectations and generated a more stable inflation scenario. The pursuit of this goal 
and the significant increase in transparency that has marked the action of monetary policy have 
                                                 
30 We have used two lags in both specifications. With IPCA and three lags, however, the values are smaller for the pass-
through: 9.6% and 4.8%. 
31 With the sample only until June 2002, all the pass-throughs were smaller, and there was no difference between the 
Real plan and inflation-targeting periods.    19
contributed to the development of the awareness of the importance of the commitment to price 
stability. 
  During this period, the regime has faced many challenges, including the construction of 
credibility – which is still a work in progress – the change in relative prices, and exchange rate 
volatility. Dealing with these challenges has required a large effort by the Central Bank, which itself 
has also learned substantially and has improved the system. The Central Bank has reacted strongly 
to inflation expectations, consistent with the inflation-targeting framework. Market expectations 
have remained under controlled, even in the presence of inflationary shocks. The estimations also 
indicate a reduction in the degree of inflation persistence.  
Even with the confidence crisis in the second half of 2002, the inflation targeting framework 
supported the burden of the crisis, allowing the nominal exchange rate to adjust and the interest rate 
to increase to prevent inflation from persisting in high levels in the economy. In view of the 
intensity and magnitude of the shocks that hit the Brazilian economy in 2001 and 2002, the cost in 
terms of output losses of a policy aimed at completely offsetting these shocks in a short period of 
time and keeping inflation within the tolerance intervals would have been significantly higher. The 
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